

Building 58 Electrical Near Miss Accident

Status Report on
Corrective Actions

September 06, 2005

Richard Debusk,
EH&S Division Director



Building 58 Near Miss

Causal Factors

A4B5C13 Accuracy/effectiveness of change not verified or not validated.

- The facility was changed in the decommissioning of a transformer substation. The removal of the wiring in the conduit as part of the decommissioning was not verified or validated, resulting in a hazard. (CA#1)

A4B3C08 Job scoping did not identify special circumstances and/or conditions.

- The special circumstances are that LBNL is an old facility and there have been many changes over the years that could have left behind hidden hazards. (CA#2,3&4)

Building 58 Near Miss

Causal Factors

A3B3C05 Incorrect assumption that a correlation existed between two or more facts.

- The assumption made was that the electrical wiring was de-energized because the electrical transformer had been removed. (CA#4)

A4B1C01 Management policy guidance/expectations not well defined, understood or enforced.

- The management expectation that only facilities electricians would perform work on facility electrical distribution systems was defined in the LBNL safety manual (Chapter 8 of PUB 3000) but was not understood by the work crew on this task on this day and was not enforced by management. The management expectation to report adverse ES&H occurrences or conditions was not well understood or communicated. (CA#4,5&6)

Building 58 Near Miss

Status of Corrective Actions

- **CA#1** The Facilities Division shall review the current process to ensure decommissioning of buildings/processes/equipment to de-energize and remove/disable excess electrical wiring is clear and effectively stated.
- **CA #2:** EHS shall review Chapter 6 of PUB 3000, “Safe Work Authorizations,” to determine how to incorporate a review of the history of hazards and special circumstances into the hazard analysis and work authorization process.
- **Status – Complete.** Facilities has reviewed their decommissioning process and acknowledged that recent revisions to the process will minimize a recurrence of the Building 58 problem if procedures are followed.
- **Status – In Progress.** Chapter 6, Appendix E is being revised to address a number of issues, including CA #2.

Building 58 Near Miss

Status of Corrective Actions

- **CA #3:** The Engineering Division shall emphasize to employees the need for adequate job scope definition and hazard analysis for all work within the division.
- **CA #4:** The EH&S Division shall prepare and disseminate a lessons learned from this event that shall include a discussion on the requirement for proper hazard analysis and use of safe work practices for all work.
- **Status – Complete.** Engineering Division Director met with individual employees and supervisors to personally emphasized key points.
- **Status – Complete.** Lesson Learned issued and TABL article published to widely disseminate key points from LL.

Building 58 Near Miss

Status of Corrective Actions

- **CA #5:** The EH&S Division shall review existing training courses and ensure the requirement for immediate reporting of abnormal events is included as appropriate.
- **CA #6:** The EH&S Division shall communicate the requirement for immediate reporting of abnormal events via the EH&S website.
- **Status – Complete.** EHS 26, EHS for Science Division Managers, Supervisors, and PIs includes discussion. EHS 10 (EHS for new hires) and EHS 20 (EHS for Operations Managers) will also be revised with this content before next session.
- **Status – Open.** EHS Website has been updated.